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Abstract. Trust establishment is hard in grid architecture by the ad
hoc nature. To set up trust in large scale of network is more difficult.
In this paper, we propose an automatic key management (AKM) model
and corresponding key construction schemes. The hierarchical structure
is formed automatically and scale seamlessly in arbitrary network sized.
Regions are configured differently according to various levels of risks
faced. The novel model provides an integrated solution for self-organized
trust establishment, upon which rich appliances are securely supported.
It is automatic, flexible, and scalable. Furthermore, simulation results
show that computation costs due to the variations are very small under
common threshold and region size settings.
1 Introduction
Computational grids are a collection of heterogeneous computers and resources
spread across multiple administrative domains with the intent of providing users
easy access to these resources. Typical characteristics of grids include simultane-
ous use of large numbers of resources with dynamic requirements, use of resources
from multiple administrative domains, complex communication structures, and
stringent performance requirements. Under easier intentional attacks, security
in this settings becomes more crucial and is eagerly needed.
To protect the grid infrastructure, Globus Toolkit [1] has been developed
(current version GT3.0) and Grid Security Infrastructure (GSI) [4] is the de facto
security standard in grid community. However, as indicated in [9], GSI suffers
from many potential security drawbacks such as uncontrolled delegation, leaky
infrastructure and insecure services. Thus, more security mechanisms must be
developed to complement GSI and finally ensure inter-grid trust establishment.
In the literature, several well known trust models have already been proposed
[5, 3, 12]. All of these trust models are designed for certain scenarios, however,
none of them is suitable to be used in large scale of grid environment efficiently.
In this paper, we proposed an automatic key management (AKM) model,
which is hierarchical and formed dynamically. We carefully study the joining and
leaving behaviors to design a scalable scheme. In addition, to achieve flexibility
and adaptability, a new concept-Regional Trust Coefficient (RTC) is introduced
to indicate the security condition of a region. To demonstrate our scheme, we
do simulations and analyze the results.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the
notations, definitions and general design of AKM. In Section 3, we describe in
detail how AKM handles adjustments to secret shares subject to common node-
based and region-based operations. Simulation results are given in Section 4.
Section 5 studies the related work. At last, we conclude the paper.
2 Automatic key management architecture
2.1 A self-organizing architecture
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Fig. 1. A Three-level Hierarchical Model
Fig. 1 depicts a hierarchical model of our architecture. The main idea of
AKM is that we maintain a relatively static upper level controlled by an oﬄine
root Trusted Authority (TA) to meet the requirement of virtual group, at the
same time, we maintain dynamic regions flexible enough to handle nodes’ join-
ing/leaving. Although the regions are highly dynamic, we can set appropriate
RTCs so that the occurrences of region-based operations is low. If we assume
that the first L + 1 levels (from level 0 to level L) of AKM are static, and the
lower levels are dynamic. For a node denoted as X on level L, we call all the
sub-regions originated from it as the Dynamic Domain (D-Domain) of X .
2.2 Notations and definitions
Informally, we introduce the definitions of some concepts used in this paper.
– Real Nodes : the leaf nodes in the hierarchical structure of AKM. They are
corresponding to real devices, and have their own PKI key pairs.
– Virtual Nodes : the branch nodes in the hierarchical structure of AKM.
They are virtual and thus do not represent real devices in the region.
– Master Node: the branch node that a node originates directly from.
– Region: consists of all the real and virtual nodes originating directly from
the same virtual node. Each virtual node corresponds to a region.
– Overall Region Size (ORS): the number of nodes which possess secret
shares originated from the same secret, i.e. the secret key of the same region,
between two consecutive secret share updates of this region.
– Regional Trust Coefficient (RTC): the security parameter indicating the
security level of a region. It is defined as the ratio of the threshold of a region
to its ORS.
– Global Trust Coefficient (GTC): the global lower limit on RTC.
In this paper, we use the following notations (shown in Table 1):
Table 1. Notations in AKM
h the height of the global key tree IDi the identifier of a node “i”
PKi the public key of a region “i” SKi the secret share held by node “i”. If
node “i” is virtual, the secret share
is also its secret key
pki the public key of a real node “i” ski the secret key of a real node “i”
SKi(M) a message M is signed by SKi q a large prime number
pn be the probability of a node being
compromised
pr be the probability of a region being
compromised
2.3 Secret sharing process
In AKM, all the region’s secret keys originate from one global secret key either
directly or indirectly. The secret sharing process based on Shamir’s threshold
scheme [8] is performed recursively from root down to the lowest level. At each
round, a region’s secret key either is destroyed after secret shares originated
from it have been distributed to all the members of the region, or has not ever
been explicitly generated. In AKM, the threshold of a region is invariable during
its lifetime, because the calculation of changing the configuration of a threshold
scheme from (n, k) to (n, k′) is much higher than that of changing from (n, k)
to (n′, k). The secret share held by a region is used as its secret key, and its
public key is generated from the secret key. Unlike virtual nodes (i.e. regions),
each real node generates its own PKI key pair through some other method.
During the initialization of AKM, an oﬄine root TA controls the key distri-
bution process from level 0 to level L, and publishes public keys of all the static
regions. However, it has no knowledge of what happens from level L+ 1 down-
wards. Namely, D-Domains are transparent to the root TA. In each D-Domain,
public keys of all the sub-regions are published to all the nodes within the do-
main. Therefore, a real node needs to store two kinds of public keys: (1) public
keys of static-level (level 0 to level L) virtual nodes which are published by the
oﬄine root TA; (2) public keys of dynamic-level (level L + 1 onwards) virtual
nodes within the D-Domain to which the node belongs.
It should be absolutely clear that the proposed AKM scheme does not requires
a preset hierarchical structure for all the nodes. Instead, AKM only requires a
small number of nodes during the initialization. More importantly, the structure
of the whole network may vary when more nodes join or leave, and such variation
does not require any TA. In addition, each region can set or change its own size
and threshold of secret sharing, as long as its RTC is not less than GTC.
3 Node-based and Region-based Operations
Common node-based and region-based operations include “Join”, “Leave”, “Merge”,
“Partition”, “Expansion”, and “Contraction”. The first two are executed in the
same way as [6], and here we concentrate on region-based operations only.
3.1 “Merge” and “Partition”
“Merge” operation happens when the number of nodes within a region drops
under its threshold. Then, the region is divided into a few parts and each part is
combined into one nearby region. Since the thresholds of the target regions are
invariable, “Merge” operation can be viewed as a series of “Join” operations.
“Partition” operation happens when RTC of a region drops under GTC or is
lower than the security level expected. A straight-forward solution is to partition
the region into two regions with almost the same size. For example, region Bi
with size 2n and the threshold k is partitioned into two regions Bi and Bm+1,
each of which has n nodes and keeps its threshold as k. For the n nodes remaining
in region Bi, they just need to renew their secret shares after the “Partition”
operation. In order to assign new secret shares to the n nodes in region Bm+1,
firstly, region Bm+1 chooses k regions at level 1, and then selects k nodes from
each of the k regions. Without lost of generality, we denote the group of the
k regions , the group of the k nodes from region Bj (j = 1, · · · , k), and the
group of all these k2 nodes as GB = {B1, · · · , Bk}, Gj = {Cj1, · · · , Cjk}, and
G = {C11, · · · , C1k, · · · , Ck1, · · · , Ckk}, respectively. Then, a “Partition”
request signed by the secret key of region Bi is generated and multicasted to all
the nodes in group G. The IDs of region Bi, Bm+1, and the k regions are sent
together with the request.
By Lagrange interpolation, we have SKBi =
∑k
j=1 SKBj lBj (IDBi) (mod q)
and SKBj =
∑k
h=1 SKCjh lCjh(0) (mod q) , where lBj (IDBi) =
∏k
r=1,r 6=j
IDBi−IDBr
IDBj−IDBr
(mod q) and lCjh(0) =
∏k
r=1,r 6=h
IDCjr
IDCjr−IDCjh
(mod q).
Combining them, we have SKBi =
∑k
j=1
∑k
h=1 SKCjh lCjh(0)lBj (IDBi) (mod q).
Similarly, we get SKBm+1. Therefore, we know that SKBm+1 − SKBi =∑k
j=1
∑k
h=1 SKCjh lCjh(0)Rj (mod q), where Rj = lBj (IDBm+1)− lBj (IDBi).
To help a node with identity C(m+1)i in region Bm+1 generate the new shares
of SKBm+1 , each node Cjh in group G computes the partial share SK
′
Cjh
=
SKCjh lCjh(0)Rj +
∑k−1
r=1 ajhrID
r
C(m+1)i
(mod q), where ajhr ∈ Zq, for r =
1, . . . , k− 1. Then distributes the partial share to node C(m+1)i. After receiving
k2 partial secret shares from the nodes in group G, node C(m+1)i adds them
together to get a share of SKBm+1 − SKBi , denoted as SK
′
C(m+1)i
. According
to the homomorphic property, each node in region Bm+1 can compute its new
share of SKBm+1 by adding SK
′
C(m+1)i
to its original share of SKBi .
3.2 “Expansion” and “Contraction”
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Fig. 2. “Expansion” Operation
“Expansion” Operation happens when RTC of a region drops under GTC or
when AKM reaches its capacity upper limit (namely, RTCs of all the regions in
AKM are equal to GTC). For example, as shown in Figure 2(a), before “Expan-
sion” the level of AKM is L. We assume that, original secret sharing of region
C1 is executed by SKDi = a0 + a1 · IDDi + · · ·+ ak−1 · ID
k−1
Di
(mod q).
Now there is a new node that wants to join, but the RTC of region C1 is
already equal to GTC. Therefore, “Expansion” operation is executed.
Firstly, chooses a group of m nodes from region C1 which will be degraded to
Level L+ 1, where k ≤ m ≤ n− k + 1. Without loss of generality, let the group
be G = {IDD1 , · · · , IDDm}. Then, selects k nodes from group G. Without loss
of generality, let the group be R = {IDD1 , · · · , IDDk}. Following that, chooses a
new identity denoted as IDDn+1 for the master node of all the nodes degraded.
According to Shamir’s threshold scheme [8], the secret share for node Dn+1
can be calculated by the k nodes in group R. However, during “Expansion”
operation, this secret share would be never calculated out or recovered explicitly,
since we do not assume the existence of a TA at this stage.
For simplicity, the same (n, k) threshold scheme is employed in the newly
created region Dn+1. Without loss of generality, we assume that a new identity
IDEi is assigned to the node whose old identity is IDDi , or the identity is
chosen by the node itself. Then each node in group R calculates the partial secret
share denoted as SK ′Ei by SK
′
Ei
= SKDj · lDn+1 +
∑k−1
r=1 bjr · ID
r
Ei
(mod q),
where lDn+1 =
∏k
h=1,h 6=j
IDDn+1−IDDh
IDDj−IDDh
, and distributes it to the node whose
new identity is IDEi . Finally, each node recovers its new secret share in the
new region by combining all the secret shares: SKEi = b0 + b1 · IDEi + · · · +
bk−1 · ID
k−1
Ei
(mod q), where b0 = SKDn+1, br =
∑k
j=1 bjr (r = 1, 2, . . . , k− 1).
Therefore, all the coefficients of the secret sharing polynomial of the new region
are cooperatively determined by the k nodes.
“Contraction” Operation happens when AKM reaches its capacity lower limit.
To ensure that the number of nodes in any region in AKM is not less than the
threshold set before, we have to decrease the level of the structure. Similar to
“Merge” operation, “Contraction” Operation can be viewed as a series of “Join”
operations as well.
4 Simulation Analysis
Intuitively observed, as in highly dynamic environment, lots of regions with
small size result in rapid transform of the structure of the key tree. On the other
hand, if their sizes are too big, we may have problems with intra-region routing.
Current on-demand routing protocols, such as AODV [7] and OLSR [2], handle
well when the size is around 100 to 250 nodes. Thus, it is suitable to set the
region size within this range.
4.1 Regions with the Same RTC
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Fig. 3. Pr with fixed RTC
As shown in Figure 3, say a single curve, we can see that the higher the RTC,
the smaller the value of pr. Therefore, it is suitable to use RTC as an approximate
index of the security condition of a region. In addition, observing the bunch of
curve, the higher the RTC, the faster the value of pr decreases. Due to the two
properties, we say that a higher RTC is good for the sake of security. However,
it leads to a higher threshold which consumes more computation power.
At the same time, we find that, when both RTC and the region size are
small, this region is easy to be compromised. For example, in Figure 3, given
that the pn is 0.01 and the RTC of a region is 0.05, pr may be higher than 0.01
when the size of the region is less than 75. Fortunately, we need to be aware
of this only during the initialization of a region. Thereafter, if nodes leave the
region, compared to the decreasing of the region size, the increase of the RTC can
bring more positive effects on the security condition of the region. For instance,
suppose a region has 40 nodes at the beginning, and its RTC is 0.05. According
to Figure 3, pr is 6.07%. After 20 nodes’ leaving the region, the region size drops
to 20. However, because its RTC increases to 0.1 at the same time, we find that
pr decreases to 1.69%. It means that this region is more secure than before.
4.2 Computational Costs of Region-based Operations
Since both “Merge” and “Contraction” operations can be viewed as a series
of “Join” operations, our simulation focuses on “Partition” and “Expansion”
operations. We run the simulation on a Pentium III 800 laptop.
Table 2 shows the computation cost of “Partition” and “Expansion” opera-
tions under different ORSs and thresholds. In the tables, GPSS stands for time
for generating partial secret shares for all the nodes in the newly generated
region, while GNSS stands for time for generating the new secret share. Simula-
tion results show that the computation cost of both “Partition” and “Expansion”
operations is quite small under common threshold and region size settings. For
example, when the ORS of a region is 100 and its threshold is 15, it only takes
31 miliseconds to complete the “Partition” operation. As to the “Expansion”
operation, the total cost is less than 8 miliseconds.
Table 2. Computation Costs of “Partition” and “Expansion” Operations
“Partition” Operation (msec) “Expansion” Operation (msec)
ORS Threshold GPSS GNSS Total GPSS GNSS Total
100 5 8.87 0.03 8.90 1.59 0.01 1.60
100 10 18.59 0.11 18.70 4.52 0.02 4.54
100 15 30.96 0.28 31.24 7.91 0.02 7.93
100 20 46.24 0.60 46.84 11.69 0.02 11.71
100 25 62.00 0.80 62.80 16.42 0.03 16.45
250 10 47.63 0.11 47.74 11.00 0.03 11.03
250 20 124.20 0.68 124.88 27.67 0.03 27.70
250 30 205.27 1.29 206.56 54.71 0.07 54.78
250 40 302.27 2.24 304.51 90.16 0.07 90.23
250 50 422.73 3.77 426.50 135.78 0.07 135.85
5 Related Works
X.509 [5], SPKI [3], and PGP [12] are three of the most well-known trust models.
The X.509 trust model [5] is centralized that each participant has a certificate
signed by a central CA. Since GSI employs X.509 certificates, this trust model can
be used within a grid domain. SPKI trust model [3] is more flexible by supporting
delegation certificate. But how to control the proxy/delegation certificates is still
an unsolved problem. PGP [12] is a distributed trust model that builds one’s trust
from its neighbors.
Technically similar with our approach, in [11], Zhou and Haas focused on
establishing a secure key management service in an ad hoc networking environ-
ment. They proposed to use threshold cryptography to distribute trust among a
set of servers. Their solutions are only suitable for a small group of servers and
are inefficient given large scale networks. In [6], Kong et al. extended the scheme
in [11] to normal nodes. It minimizes the effort and complexity for mobile clients
to locate and contact the service providers. One major weakness of this scheme
is that it becomes either inefficient or insecure with increasing participants. In
[10], a more extreme case, where there is no CA at all, was considered. Each user
is its own authority domain and issues public-key certificates to other users.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed a hierarchical trust establish model, which is efficient,
flexible and scalable. By building a dynamic key management scheme, we achieve
strong security without much tradeoff on efficiency. Furthermore, simulation
results show that our scheme is very efficient under common threshold and region
size settings.
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